To Protect Lives…Then What? The Problem with Humanitarian Intervention in Libya

An anti-Gaddafi protester with his fingers painted in the colors of the old Libyan flag. Photo courtesy of www.thestar.com

About a week ago, the head of the interim government of Eastern Libya, Mustafa Abdul-Jalil, pleaded to the international community for support in their struggle against Libyan government forces: “It has to be immediate action…the longer the situation carries on, the more blood is shed.” This quest for peace and liberation from oppression and aggression by long-term brutal dictator Muammar el-Qadaffi has been heard and answered. The world is at war once again. The United Nations Security Council has successfully passed Resolution 1973 calling on the international community “to take all necessary measures to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack”. As a result, the international partners, under the leadership of the United States, have effectively implemented a no-fly zone in order to prevent Qadaffi from carrying out attacks on his own population. There is overwhelming public and international support for preventing this ruthless dictator from committing crimes against humanity and waging war against his people. Why wouldn’t there be? That being said, the multi-nation Operation Odyssey Dawn, acting under Chapter VII of the Security Council, falls short in precisely addressing a wide range of issue such as failing to define a realistic and sustainable goal of its mission and purpose, not only for the soldiers and citizens of contributing countries, but more importantly, the people of Libya.

Humanitarian Intervention

The concept and legitimacy of humanitarian intervention is probably as controversial as it is contradictory and confusing. In order to uphold the Westphalia principles and state sovereignty, which should be associated with the defining principles of interstate relations and the foundation of world order, article 2(7) of the UN Charter clearly states that “nothing should authorize intervention in matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.” In other words, the principle of non-intervention allows sovereign states to freely choose the socio-economic and cultural policies to be adopted in one’s own territory on the basis of independence and legal equality of all states. Incidentally, Chapter VII entitles the Security Council to take action in cases of a “threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression”. This is where the doctrine of humanitarian intervention has evolved as a concept in international law, predominantly after the end of the Cold War. The most compelling argument for defining the intervention in Libya is humanitarian in nature; compatible with the definition of humanitarian intervention as a “justifiable use of force for the purpose of protecting the inhabitants of another state from treatment so arbitrary and persistently abusive as to exceed the limits within which the sovereign is presumed to act with reasons and justice.” Given its clear rational and moral justification, there is one major problem that stands in the way: humanitarian intervention conflicts with state sovereignty (one of the most fundamental principles of international law). As a consequence, a clear legal justification is necessary to validate its use.

Let’s say the international community has established legitimacy via multilateral intervention combined with a UN mandate–here are some areas where I see inconsistencies and long term strategic problems:

1.) Goal of the Mission

The coalition forces have repeatedly emphasized that they will act no further than the UN mandate’s capacity and limits. At the same time, the entire international community has demanded that Gadhafi step down and continues to do so. However, the problem is that the resolution falls way short of accomplishing such a goal. It merely calls for the protection of civilians, the establishment of a no-fly zone, as well as an arms embargo and the freezing of assets. At this stage of the war, with continuing violence by Gadhafi and loyal government forces, there is absolutely no chance that the lunatic is changing his mind and voluntarily giving up power any time soon. It is even more unrealistic to assume that there will be a peaceful and stable Libya if Gadhafi remains in power. This scenario would be a major setback and embarrassment for everyone involved in the intervention, especially the United States. As a consequence, I believe that one of these Tomahawks will eventually, and by that I mean accidently of course, hit another one of Gadhafi’s compounds, or one or many of the intervening countries will have to bite the bullet and send in ground troops.

2.) US Decreasing Role in Libya

After leading the way and providing the capabilities to implement a no-fly zone, President Obama has made it clear that the US mission is limited to the next few days and that no US boots will ever touch Libyan ground. If that is actually the case, and I am predicting that Obama will significantly decrease the US’ engagement in the war as soon as possible due to congressional pressures and well…being broke and still fighting two other wars, then who has the experience and willingness to successfully take over the leadership of Operation Odyssey Dawn? Europeans taking the lead, US in a supporting role – has the world turned upside down?

3.) Divided NATO/EU

At this point, no one really knows who will take charge of the operation in Libya when the Americans are forced to push back. The bureaucratic nightmare of European institutions is more visible than ever before. President Obama has openly demanded a strong role of NATO, however French President Nicolas Sarkozy sees his leadership role and “savior of Libya” image threatened and has decided to block a temporary NATO takeover as he is keen to establish an Anglo-French command under an EU umbrella. In one of the high-level meetings in Paris, Secretary General of NATO Anders Fogh Rasmussen went so far as to accuse France, Turkey and Germany of intentionally constraining the work of the Alliance after which the German and French representatives furiously stormed out of the conference room. Moreover, Turkey, with its predominantly Muslim population, is dissatisfied with NATO plans and involvement, but that might have to do with the fact that they were not invited to attend the Libya summit in Paris. Rumor has it that some of the newer eastern European NATO members like Romania, Bulgaria and Czech Republic have put strong pressure on France and made clear that they are willing to help enforce the UN resolution and a no-fly zone in Libya. This has apparently led to a softening of Sarkozy’s stance on NATO’s future involvement. For now, members of the Alliance have agreed on the enforcement of the arms embargo against Libya. But will it also be in charge of the no-fly zone and further needed military operations? Who will maintain order and further prevent escalation? The point to make is that without the US in command, there is no definitive leadership. In a recent article in the Guardian, one observer of Anglo-American military adventures over the last 20 years tried to shed some light on the impasse and how NATO should run the operation. “It’s a bit like a barn dance, half of the people can’t dance, a couple are drunk and then there’s always the characters at the back with their hands up various skirts.”

4.) A New Era of Humanitarian Intervention?

If protecting the lives of inhabitants of another state from arbitrary and persistent abuses by its regime is the new premise for intervention, then we have to ask ourselves why nothing has been done in the Ivory Coast. We also have to carefully monitor and consider intervention in countries like Bahrain, Yemen or Syria where anti-regime protests have been answered with brutal force and targeted killing of civilians. As a result, the intervention in Libya not only needs a clearer mission statement but more importantly it necessitates a well defined exit-strategy, or otherwise the political consequences will be monumental.

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